Non-Buddhism

11 responses to “Spectral Discourse”

1. 

   Mal

   April 19, 2016

   Why hasn’t every professional astronomer died of boredom? Has their changing, growing “analytic” self died in the bringing to being of a fixed “university” self? As a child they were, perhaps, excited by Carl Sagan’s “gosh, wow” presentation skills, which determined them to become another Carl Sagan, not knowing (initially) that much boredom & hardship would have to be faced in becoming a “university” astronomer. Of course, many leave boring astronomy to become wall street bankers – still boring, but much better paid. And by that time they think, “life is boring”, and any alternative “philosophy” they hysterically seek out (e.g., Buddhism…) is also boring. So how do we avoid boredom? On today’s experience, I’d recommend listening to the Colin Davis/LSO Live version of Sibelius’ third symphony, or reading Balzac’s Germinal. Anyone have tips on avoiding boredom? Am in danger of becoming hysterical in my pursuit of the non-boring?

2. 

   Patrick jennings

   April 19, 2016

   Hi Glenn,

   How do we differentiate between the “hysterical subject” and the subject produced by process of engaging with “the facilitator of the analyst’s discourse”

   On the face of it such a subject should be free from “the desire for wholeness that the master discourse so deftly arouses” This freedom is, it seems, enabled by a cooperative project between analyst and client in which the analyst contributes by refusing “to offer his or anyone else’s desire as the subject’s own, and thereby thwarts the subject’s longed-for replication of (another’s) identity. The subject, freed from the curative fantasy, can begin to “construct signifiers that obtain from his or her own, uncoerced, desire”

   But:

   Is there any such thing as “uncoerced desire”? If there is how can one know one is engaging in such a process and not simply replicating either the subject of hysteria or the Master subject?

   “The analyst discourse postulates a completely different kind of relationship between the one supposed to know and the one who desires to know. The teacher as “analyst,” namely, knows that, of the kind of knowledge the practitioner seeks from him, he knows nothing at all. (In a very real sense, the practitioner does not even know what he seeks.)”

   I don’t think I need to give specific examples of Zen, Dzogchen or Mahamudra figures who make such claims for their particular practice. Your own example of the quintessential Buddhist hysteric fits the bill.

   “Here, there are no ancestors and no buddhas. Bodhidharma is a stinking foreigner. Shakyamuni is a dried-up piece of shit. “Awakening” and “nirvana” are posts to tether donkeys. The scriptural canon was written by devils; it’s just paper for wiping infected skin boils. None of these things will save you.”

   Style of expression, constituting a discursive field or “thought collective”is of no help in differentiating this as master, hysteric, or analysand discourse, since the rhetoric goes to extremes of rejection of the Master signification. Nor is “content” a help since the quintessential mark of the Master signifier is his ability to put an end to the tendency of all signification to slide towards nebulosity and undermine the discursive power to coerce. That is to say it is the master who rules on the matter of content by setting the epistemological parameters.
   Nor can we look to the history of Lacanian-ism to confirm that we are producing a (relatively) free subject and not an “hysteric” or a subject of Lacanian Master discourse. I don’t think there is a more forceful example of “university” discourse than the academic co-option of Lacanian discourse and the subsequent history of the Lacanian “thought collective” or its “bureaucracy”. With Lacanian academic discourse we’re right back in “the shackles of the master’s brutal discourse.”

   It seems to me that your text “hovers close to the monstrous empty signifier of human existence.” Or to put it in Althusserian terms, it either remains ideological or becomes a discourse without a subject-a science of sorts in which the “facilitator (as a subject) disappears in some way, or occupies an ambiguous space.

   There again one could invoke a form of science here to differentiate what the “facilitator”is at – the very same non-subject of science Althusser used to save himself from an inescapable ideological bind. Your text refuses to bring a scientific non-subject into play.
   Which seems to leave the quality of relationship between analyst and analysand as the decisive factor. Here, though, we are on familiar Buddhist ground, since, for Mahamudra, as one example, just such a relationship is key to the effectiveness of the “pointing out instructions” which initiate one into the truth that “ there was ever anything decisive to be known at all, much less anyone who knew it”

   Which leaves me with this to chew over:

   “In fact, a genuine fusion of the analyst’s discourse and meditation rhetoric would entail a kind of “non-buddhism,”

   I wish this text were such a “fusion” (although I prefer “recalibration”) but my (first) impression is that it might be in danger of replicating the (Lacanian) Masters discourse by skating too far from the abyss.

   I think of the Non-Buddhist project as engaged in a non-(philosophically) justified but rigorous recalibration of all Master discourses, which is what every discourse inevitably becomes when it functions to replicate particular power relations; exactly what Lacanian discoursedoes in an academic setting at least. I don’t know anything about the “practice” of Lacanian psychoanalysis and so I put my bets on Laruelles unbearably difficult abstractions and “a kind of non-buddhism.” Of course I could just be replicating the subject of another Masters discourse. Or, perhaps, I am just being “hysterical”; or even paranoid?

   Anyway thanks for yet another nourishing bone to chew on. I cant be generous in praise of your text for fear of replicating the hysteric and in the process elevating you to the status of “Master replicator”.

3. 

   George Laird

   April 19, 2016

   In regard to Wallis, “‘traversing the fantasy’ that there was ever anything decisive to be known at all, much less anyone who knew it,” Jennings points out, “the quality of relationship between analyst and analysand as the decisive factor.” I agree and would add such relationship can and do culminate at times in an intersubjective virtuosity that obliterates and/or inverts the distinction – a state of affairs, (Wallis “discovered co-equivalence”) to which Peter Hershock refers in the context of Chinese Chan as “liberating intimacy,” and which I believe obtains in another context as the love one’s neighbor as oneself. However I’m not at all certain how the polemics of any ism or non-ism contributes to this as a matter of practice in everyday life.

4. 

   Patrick jennings

   April 19, 2016

   Hi George,

   You misunderstand my point . The “quality of relationship ” is not the decisive factor. As I said such “quality of relationship” is claimed by many strands of Buddhism as a key ingredient of the path to “enlightenment”. There is a mountain of analysis and commentary within Buddhism on this point, none of it convincing. Which leaves me, as I said, chewing on Glenns statement about a “sort of non-buddhism” as the key factor, since its axiomatic enables a use of Lacan without the danger of replicating a Master (or hysteric) discourse while rummaging about in the history of ideas.

5. 

   Patrick jennings

   April 20, 2016

   “Polemics begins with the assumption that religious interlocutors’ susceptibility to complacent agreement is so pronounced that nothing short of a relentless return to the ostensible matter at hand—careful examination of knowledge of ostensibly cosmic significance—will help.”

   I would add another assumption . That the polemical nature of non-buddhism arises out of its relation with non-philosophy and Marxism. Laruelle’s -“harassment” and Marx’s “alienation”, which it is meant to replace, take critique out of the realm of an academic scholastics and into the realm of practice, which as far as I understand it, is a dialectic in which thinking and action combine in dynamic ways as the motor of radical politics.

   In fact, from a Marxist perspective, this radical politics is (partly) a “careful examination of knowledge of ostensibly cosmic significance”, since, for Marx, radical politics is the restoration of a true relation between “man”and the “cosmos” as against an inverted consciousness of that relation.

   There is a connection between the practice of polemics in the way you describe it and the existence of a collective. I don’t think it matters much whether we frame the question in terms of a religious tradition (the community) or a radical one (the party). The dialectic is the same. Its a tricky business, since in the beginning at least, the dynamic –the taking seriously of an interlocutor’s view requires the pummeling of premises, the scorching of propositions, the ruthless exposure of poor thinking, and the parading out of fallacies.– can scuttle the community or collective before it even begins its work in the “World”. It seems to be the case that the exercise of polemics between community members requires a different set of ethical parameters as that between opposing interests or camps, if only because of the work of building a cohesive community to enable action in the world, or as the fledgling exemplar of a new world.

   The admonition that “By their fruits shall they be known” might have some very practical implications for anyone interested in “party” or “community” building.

6. 

   Mal

   April 20, 2016

   Correction to my last post – that should, of course. be Zola’s “Germinal”…

7. 

   Mal

   April 20, 2016

   Patrick Jennings asks is there any such thing as “uncoerced desire”? Surely hunger is an example of uncoerced desire? Of course, you might say it is coerced by bodily need. But I don’t think Patrick was thinking of coercion in that way. The most important thing is that it is not coerced by one’s hysteria or a Master. BUT, does the satisfaction of hunger always involve coercion? For instance, I may choose a piece of fruit rather than a chocolate bar because the Master of i wins out over the Master of Advertising. (Both very suspect Masters! How does one free oneself from coercion in the satisfaction of one’s hunger? Wittgenstein always had egg and cheese for lunch so he would never have to think about such a trivial matter, Buddhist monks eat what they are given. But should we eat any old slop or “cheese again” if we have a feeling of revulsion or boredom about our food?)

   P.S. I got bored with listening to classical music and reading Zola this morning! What do I do now? The only craving in my field of consciousness, at the moment, is to play internet chess. But I consider this an addiction, as it’s an activity that always leads to frustration, stress and boredom (combined with desire to play again even though frustrated, stressed and bored.) “Meditate” you Buddhists might say, but the prospect of doing that is just too boring. Anyway, writing this has been quite interesting, but I’m starting to get bored… where’s that chess board…

8. 

   wtpepper

   April 20, 2016

   Glenn,

   This is a potentially productive approach to thinking about Western Buddhism, but perhaps for that very reason it’s not surprising that the book it was meant for won’t get published. The goal of the university, including university presses, is always to guarantee that no actual thought ever occurs, that the existing ‘knowledge’ is unthinkingly reproduced. This is why, in the US, we have structured our academic disciplines in such a way that things like psychoanalytic theory is no longer a part of any discipline, so that no college graduate will have ever encountered it beyond brief mentions in textbooks. To have these two kinds of Buddhists collide in one text would highlight all the empty space of potential knowledge that is structurally excluded by the structure of academic disciplines.

   What is the university for, if not to endlessly reproduce more complex Ptolemaic models while keeping any potential Galileo safely locked out?

   I have usually thought of X-buddhisms as primarily working on the model of this discourse of the university. Consider what Zizek claims here:

   “One of the telltale signs of university discourse is that the opponent is accused of being “dogmatic” and “sectarian.” University discourse cannot tolerate an engaged subjective stance. Should not our first gesture be, as Lacanians, to heroically assume this designation of being “sectarian” and engage in a “sectarian” polemic?”

   What is more common in Buddhist discourse than to dismiss the opponent as “clinging to views” or as having an “agenda,” while claiming for itself the position of absolute objective thoughtlessness and the goal of complete passive inaction?

   However, as I read your description, I began to consider whether the Master’s discourse might be more common. One way to decide this is to ask what the social function of the practice is–what does it work to produce?

   Because clearly we can’t be concerned with the “intentions” of the participants–as you’ve pointed out, we just are effects of discourses, we are not autonomous selves who freely choose a discourse to participate in. Lacan explains that the Master always “fails to understand anything,” is the one most caught in delusion. And clearly enough this is true of the “Masters” in all of our popular Buddhist discourses? Unable to understand even the most fundamental concepts of Buddhist thought, they function only to hide the fundamentally socially constructed and divided nature of the subject, and to keep their disciples clamoring for the illusory transcendent wholeness they pretend to embody–while, of course, it is these Masters who remain the most desperately needy and lacking, endlessly seeking adoration (in the form of devotion, praise, money) to prove their own superiority.

   So now I’m thinking about what each discourse produces. Because surely the goal of the university discourse is to prevent real knowledge, and to endlessly reproduce split subjects, deluded about their own nature, unable to think the causes and conditions that produce them. But is this the function of X-Buddhism? It might have been the function of something like abhidamma Buddhism, but I don’t know that it is the function that Western Buddhism serves.

   It seems you may be right that the discourse of the Master dominates, here. The goal here is not to produce that fractured and ignorant desiring subject (already produced in abundance in the discourse of the university–keeping in mind that this discourse isn’t only in the actual university; Zizek mentions that Stalinism was structured like a discourse of the university, and I would suggest American society is today just Stalinism universalized). Instead, the discourse of Buddhism needs to operate at a different point, where these subjects threaten to stop working. I looked back on my review of Epstein’s book on The Trauma of Everyday Life (I think it’s still on this site somewhere? At any rate, it’s in the “Faithful Buddhist” ebook). I discussed the Master-Slave dialectic there, but I thought this was at work in Epstein because of his role in the discourse of mental-health and medicine. But I think perhaps all of Buddhism is working in this way?

   So what does the discourse of the analyst do? It isn’t a matter of individual relationships, or personal choice. The point is that as a discourse, it functions to remove the reifications and blockages produced in the other discourses. But it needs to engage in some specific sectarian polemic–to say something concrete about some actual practice in the world! Your conclusion ends with a call to participate in that discourse, to engage in polemics that can reveal and disarm the impediments to actual action. Sadly, as usual, the response it inspires is more of the discourse of the hysteric, endlessly shouting incoherent superficial misreadings of a bevy of thinkers, looking for one more authority to cite, posing as the courageous embodiment of the pure and cynical position, too superior to engage the world, but brave enough to think only in empty abstractions.

   I don’t always agree with Zizek, but on this point I think he’s dead right. We need to engage in sectarian polemics, and ignore the endless assertions about how childish foolish and naive it is to ever take any action in the world.

   Of course, the problem that we face in the discourse of the analyst is that, unlike the master, the analyst is not praised and rewarded, has no fans or following. The analyst is mostly reviled, or just dismissed as a useless fool–but the product is subjects with more agency in the world.

   I’m less and less able to engage in this discourse myself, I’ll admit. But the goal needs to be to analyze something concrete, to take some practice in the world and dismantle it, and face the hatred and idiotic shouting and then dismissal, with the goal of producing one or two more subjects freed from the delusions that have trapped them in the endless and miserable blind reproduction of the existing social system. Not, of course, that they’ll then be freed from all discourse–they’ll just be more aware of the socially constructed and conditional nature of their master signifiers, so able to engage in concrete action in the world that doesn’t reproduce, but may remake it.

   By the way, where did you find that picture? It’s amazing. I looked up the artist, Chris Mars, and found a website that seems to have become inactive about three years ago. Fascinating and powerful work there, though. I hope he’s still active.

   Sorry for such a long and tedious post. Brevity has never been a feature of the discourse into which I’m interpellated.

9. 

   Mumon

   April 23, 2016

   I think you do make many valid points, but I have to admit: I only got to the sutras part of you piece here. I’m sorry, but even with practice one can have a short attention span, especially if one, like me, is in management. Plus when you get promoted to management, you lose 10 points of IQ, and it goes on from there as you get promoted.

   But I think you do make valid points about the sutras. That said, I don’t think they need to be read the way you read it or the way others would read it for an “authoritative view.” One “teacher” of Zen said they were like opera. I disagree with that too, from what I’ve read.

   This might arise from my own temporal deformation – that is, having lived a life in a particular area and interval of time, but if I read something like the Lotus Sutra, yes, yes, you have the Buddha as authority who doesn’t care about those with whom he is in discussion, but to me, that’s a feature not a bug, and not for reasons you’d think. The reason I’d think is: irony. My argument with fundamentalist monotheists, after the whole putting the text into historical context thing, is Poe’s Law. That is, it could be propaganda or parody.

   The Lotus Sutra is a whole bunch of words that is self-referential, situated as a dialogue in which the Buddha is more oracular machine than human. Most of the text seems to have the point: Do NOT take this literally. But every now and then, some important point is expressed: Save the freakin’ kid in the burning house by any means necessary, but preferably without screwing things up too much. Compassion is where you find it right now. Reconciliation with a prodigal involves work on all parties behalf.

   Anyway, I’m sorry I didn’t read through the whole post; it was a bit disrespectful of your efforts in writing the whole thing. That said, scanning the rest of it, I would criticize the use of bureaucracy instead of using the more neutral organization; the former carries a loaded inference of indifference; the latter need not be. We all know that dysfunctional organizations are universal; but that needs the added context that dysfunction in an organization does not mean the organization is not effective. That is, yeah, organizations are staffed with fallible human beings being fallible, but you get something for that.

10. 

    Mal

    April 25, 2016

    Mumon, what do you mean by an “effective” organisation? Effective in creating a happier world for everyone, or effective in making money for the shareholders and top management at the expense of universal happiness? If it’s the latter, then effectiveness is a big problem, not something to admire. You joke that IQ points start being dropped the higher in management you go. I think it’s actually worse than that. Corporations are psychopaths writ large, and the higher in management you go the more psychopathic you become. Better to remain a working drudge, then you remain free to moan about the psychopaths that boss you about without becoming a psychopathic management cell acting for the tyrannical corporate beast.

    P.S. Try reading Zola’s Germinal, it might put you off seeking or maintaining any kind of management position! Stay with the workers and use your IQ points (and obvious empathy) to organise an effective union that seeks greater happiness for all workers (and even the management, if they get with the programme…)

11. Psychological Humanities: Teo (2017) – Davood Gozli

    January 14, 2021

    […] You could read about Lacan’s four discourses in Slavoj Žižek’s Jacques Lacan’s Four Discourses. I first heard about these from Glenn Wallis, who introduces them in his Spectral Discourse. […]